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Despite agriculture being the primary source of livelihood for more than half of India’s population, several
socio-economic policies are implemented in the Indian agricultural sector without paying enough attention to
the possible outcomes of the policies. The negative impact of some policies can be seen in the huge distress
suered by farmers as documented by several studies and reported in the media on a regular basis. In this
paper, we model a specic troubled agricultural sub-system in India as a Multi-Agent System and use it to
analyse the impact of some policies. Ideally, we should be able to model the entire system, including all
the external dependencies from other systems - for example availability of labour or water may depend on
other sources of employment, water rights and so on - but for our purpose, we start with a fairly basic model
not taking into account such external eects. As per our knowledge there are no available models which
considers factors like water levels, availability of information and market simulation in the Indian context.
So, we plugged in various entities into the model to make it suciently close to observed realities, at least in
some selected regions of India. We evaluate some policy options to get an understanding of changes that may
happen once such policies are implemented. Then we recommended some policies based on the result of the
simulation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Motivation: Socio-economic policy is often formulated and implemented without paying close
attention to the possible outcomes of such policy. In the current environment when material
conditions change rapidly it is especially important to have appropriate policy responses to avoid
adverse socio-economic impact leading to human distress.
The complexity in strategic management of socio-economic systems lies in the analysis of time
evolving structural changes and dynamic aspects of the system [12]. Most policy prescriptions are
based on qualitative analysis or simple mathematical models that are often too simple to predict
outcomes with condence. The stochastic nature of the problems and various aspects connected
with individual social behavior are very dicult to capture in such mathematical models[16].
Kremmydas [10] describes principles for modelling economic systems using the Agent Based
Modelling(ABM) approach and gives its features, advantages and disadvantages. We have chosen
the Agent Based modelling approach because of the following two reasons:
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(1) The interactions of the various agents in the system form the basis for the macroscopic
equilibrium that the system attains and so following a bottom-up approach, simulating the
behaviour and interactions of individual agents is likely to lead to better results compared
to a top-down model that may miss out on interactions between agents that aect the
dynamics and the nal state of the system.
(2) The system can display “emergent properties”. Bar Yam (1997)[3] distinguishes two types
of emergence, local and global. A phenomenon is emergent if it requires new categories to
describe that are not required to describe the behavior of the underlying components. Local
emergence is met in low complexity systems where the emergent properties are maintained
by some parts of the system as dened in [4]. On the other hand, global emergence is
present only in the system as a whole. For example, in our simulations when farmers were
not allowed to interact with each other, each tried to optimize by choosing actions based
solely on the choices available to them. But when interaction of Type1 and Type3 farmers
was allowed (they are dened in section 3), a Type3 farmer would lend water to a Type1
farmer and also dictate the crop to be produced[17]. This way, the farmers would mass
produce a commodity, making more room for prot and improved payment security.
In the past few years, several attempts have been made to model dierent socio-economic
systems using agent based modelling [6], like climate change adaptation [19], pension system
in Russia, urban planning and so on[13]. Multi-Agent Simulation was also used in the analysis
of food supply chains where emphasis was given to environmental impact and agent decision
processes [9], or analysing the impact of agricultural policies on combination of geophysical and
social models specic to a geographic location [11]. But the decision process and the interaction
among agricultural sector agents varied greatly depending on the traditions and practises prevalent
in the region of interest. In India, this kind of modelling is not yet used. Due to dierent conditions
environmental, social and economic the strategies available to farmers vary signicantly. The
viability of farming depends on the strategies and payos for actions available to the agents, which
can be veried from the results presented in this paper. We wanted to simulate various scenarios
where the concerned parties interacted with each other and how these interactions were aected
due to the implementation of certain policies. We also wanted to understand how accessibility to
information aected the business of small scale farmers and wanted to understand the ecacy
of policies implemented by the Government of India in the agricultural sector. We have chosen a
relatively autonomous agricultural sub-system in the sugarcane supply chain as our target system.
In our simulations we have analysed results by varying import prices, export prices, FRP (Fair and
Remunerative Price) of sugarcane, and the ethanol requirement for the Ethanol Blending Program
for auto fuel. We have also done simulations where we vary the information accessible to various
sections of farmers and consider various crop alternatives that farmers can use based on the region.
2 OVERVIEW OF THE INDIAN SUGARCANE INDUSTRY
In 2016-17 the production of sugar was approximately 20.3 million tons when domestic consumption
was approximately 24.5 million tons - a shortfall of about 4.2 million tons. This lead to increase in
sugar prices and sugar was imported to control prices. The cane farmers responded by increasing
the plantation of sugarcane and in the 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 the total sugar produced was 32.5
million tons and 35.9 million metric tons, which led to a crash in sugar prices in both the years[2].
International sugar prices were also depressed, ranging between Rs 22-Rs 26 per kg in 2017-2019
so even the export option was not available[5]. In 2019-2020 the government mandated FRP for
sugarcane was Rs.275/- per Quintal (100Kg) and in Uttar Pradesh it was Rs.325 per Quintal. FRP is
the government mandated price at which the sugar mills buy sugarcane from farmers. If the mills
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do not have enough funds to buy sugarcane from the farmers, then cane is borrowed and the due
amount is calculated with the current FRP, which is payable later when the funds are available.
MSP (Minimum Support Price) is the price at which the Government of India buys crops or farm
produce directly from farmers. MSP is applicable only to certain types of crops. Due to high FRP,
the sugar mills are not able to pay the farmers and this has led to a piling up of sugarcane payment
dues to farmers to the tune of Rs.220 billion [2]. This is an economically disastrous situation for
sugar mills and and has meant wide spread economic distress for sugarcane farmers. The most
recent sugarcane farmer protest happened on 16th December 2019 urging the State Government of
Haryana to increase the prices of sugarcane[15]. Under the Ethanol Blended Petrol program, the
blend targets have been increased from 5 % to 10% in 2019[14]. We analysed the outcomes of the
policy changes introduced by the Central Government of India and included them in the results.
3 OUR APPROACH
We have modelled the sugarcane industry as a Multi-Agent System with the following agents. The
behaviour of the agents and their attributes are based on what we have been able to nd out about
the sugar industry from existing published or online sources.
(1) Type1 Farmer Farmer with low savings (1 million rupees) and 1.5 ha (hectare) land for
agricultural use. The water resources are limited and in some cases not sucient for
farming certain varieties of crops. Around 70% of the farmers belong to this category.
The information present with these farmers is very limited. Information is modelled as a
Gaussian with mean as the actual value being queried and standard deviation depending
on the type of farmer.[7]
(2) Type2 Farmer Farmer with average savings (3 million rupees) and 3 ha land for agricultural
use and sucient water sources for farming any kind of crop. The information present
with these farmers is quite reliable with unit standard deviation[7]
(3) Type3 Farmer Farmer with average savings (5 million rupees) and 4.5 ha land for agri-
cultural use, abundant water sources which can be lent to Type1 Farmers in exchange
for a specic variety of a crop produce[17], good sources of information regarding sales,
produce, import/export. This type of farmer has some income from Type1 farmers and
can inuence mills and cold storage owners due to their ability to dictate the crop to be
produced by type1 farmers, this agent is crucial for coordination among type1 farmers.
They are assumed to have perfect information. [7]
(4) Water agent Agent that sells water for a price, unlike the Type3 farmer where the crop is
dictated and collected as payment. They are controlled by government, so policies can be
imposed.[17]
(5) Loan agent Agent that provides working capital based on collateral or a credit score. The
collateral based loans have 8% rate of interest, but credit based loans have 12% rate of
interest. In general, the collateral based loan interests are paid with higher preference
because after 4 defaults the collateral is conscated and the dierence is paid back to the
customer.
(6) Mill agent Agent that accepts the sugarcane produce, and generates sugar or alcohol. This
agent accepts the produce, but pays when there are enough funds to pay the farmers. Till
then the due is recorded. The mill agent goes to the farmers only if a threshold produce is
met.
(7) Storage agent Agent that accepts the produce to be stored and retrieved when necessary
by the farmers. Type3 Farmers have inuence on this agent, so they are given higher
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preference followed by Type2 farmers and Type1 Farmers. The storage cost and spoilage
of commodities is dependant on the type of crop.[18]
(8) Market agent Agent that sets the price of the commodities based on demand, supply
and commodity. All the sale happens via this agent. The price is altered based on the
trend of the sales and commodity stock available, so we check how much the sale in
each cycle varied from the usual sale. Using this sale dierence and with higher priority
given to the recent cycles, we proportionately alter the price based on the past 4 cycles.
For example if the sale dierences in the past 4 cycles are -5%, +5%, +10%, +2%, we do
0.4 ∗ 2%+ 0.3 ∗ 10%+ 0.2 ∗ 5%− 0.1 ∗ 5%. So, we increase the current price from the previous
price by 4.3%.
(9) Consumer agent This is the agent that consumes the commodity and creates demand.
The need for each commodity is within a specied limit irrespective of the price of the
commodity, for example sugar consumption from 2015-2019 has been in the range of 24.5
million tons to 26 million tons per year[1]. Even with very low sugar prices and high
availability of sugar, the demand cannot rise dramatically because human consumption has
an upper bound. In 2018 19.5 kg of sugar was recorded as the per capita consumption. So,
the total sale of sugar within past 4 cycles is used to calculate the demand for the current
cycle. We have chosen a cycle as 3 months in this example, so in each cycle the usual
demand should be 4.9 kg. So, if the current price is 10% lower than the previous cycle, and
the sugar purchased in the past 4 cycles is 20% lower than the usual demand for the 4 cycles
(19.5 kg), then the current demand would be 1.1 ∗ 1.2 ∗ 4.9kд. This is because due to 10%
decrease in price, we expect 10% increase in demand, and because there was 20% less sugar
purchased previous year, we expect shortage in the stockpiled sugar and the demand to go
up by 20%. The Indian market is highly price sensitive.
Due to abundance of labour in India, the labour charges are considered xed, and increase solely by
ination. Type1 farmers do not have sucient information and hence their choices rarely give the
expected outcomes. But due to the inuence of type3 farmers, the type1 farmers planted sugarcane
and chose to keep planting sugarcane even after the farmers started getting their water from a
water agent and not a type3 farmer. Hence the type3 farmers are crucial, using their information
they choose to maximise their prot by forcing the type1 farmers to produce crops that would
yield higher income than other crops, which the type1 farmers rely on in future time cycles. The
following gures 1 to 7 show the interactions among agents.
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Fig. 1. A basic template view of interactions among agents. The interactions of each agent are shown
separately later.
Fig. 2. This figure shows how the Type1 farmer interacts with other agents
Fig. 3. This figure shows how the Type2 farmer interacts with other agents
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Fig. 4. This figure shows how the Type3 farmer interacts with other agents
Fig. 5. This figure shows how the Storage agent interacts with other agents
Fig. 6. This figure shows how the market agent interacts with other agents
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Fig. 7. This figure shows how the mill agent interacts with other agents
4 RESULTS
We will see how some of the most common policies implemented by the government aect the
system. We also show some alternate policies that give some good results in the simulations.
First we dene what is meant by good results. In the simulations we have set 70% of the farmers
to be of Type1, 20% as Type2 and remaining as Type3 [8]. We have simulated using 10,000 farmer
agents. Now, if the total savings goes below a certain number, a family cannot be sustained, so in
that case the farmer “moves out of farming" and nds an alternate source of income. So, in the
simulations if a farmer’s savings goes below the cumulative per-person-charge for a family for 4
time steps then the farmer stops farming and moves to a dierent line of work. Ideally, the number
of farmers moving out should be 0 assuming no other external inuences, which means farming is
sustainable. But, that is not the case, the simulations show that without proper help the number of
farmers moving out can go as high as 80-90%. So, in the simulations we use number of farmers
moving out as the metric for testing the ecacy of a policy.
We will see how the simulations run for the current real world values for the parameters like
FRP, demand and export prices.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 8. (a) Graph of the number of farmers moving out vs FRP for sugarcane in Rs/intal (b) Graph of the
savings of Type1 farmers vs time steps when FRP is 220 per intal (c) Graph of the savings of Type1 farmers
vs time steps when FRP is 480 per intal
As we can see from Figure 8(a), changing the FRP for sugarcane does not help the farmer. Rather
higher values of FRP increases the number of farmers moving out of sugarcane farming. This is
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because, FRP is the initial income expectation. Due to it being high, most of the sugarcane farmers
plant sugarcane. Now, if the FRP is low, after the rst few time steps, the farmers deem the income
unsustainable and stop planting it all together. But with high FRP, the number of time steps before
the income expectation falls from FRP to a non protable income is higher. Even the mill owners
keep track of the sugar already existing and hence they do not buy if they have excess sugar. So,
when the farmers keep producing sugarcane and the mill owners buy very limited amounts of
sugarcane it leads to the farmers dumping sugarcane that makes the situation worse. We can see
this eect from Figures 8(b) and 8(c). In 2014, sugar price fell to Rs.24 per kg, in the crushing
season of 2015, several mills in Uttar Pradesh refused to buy sugarcane from farmers. After the
government made it mandatory for mill owners to buy sugarcane from farmers, the arrears of
2016-2017 reached Rs.25.35 billion.
(a) (b)
Fig. 9. (a) Graph of the number of farmers moving out vs demand of sugar in intals (b) Graph of the
number of farmers moving out vs export price of sugar in Rs/intal
From gure 9(a) we can see changing the demand is not helpful either, unless the demand is
very high. As the price is very low rationally the market simply exports the sugar. But since export
prices are low it does not boost incomes which does not help in reducing the stress.
From gure 9(b), we can see that without much increase in export price not much dierence can
be seen in the number of farmers exiting from farming. The reason is the same as before. If the
export price is signicantly higher then most of the produce is exported leading to increased prices
which depresses demand and the number of farmers moving out becomes higher.
The increase in storage facilities do not help increase the income of Type1 farmers signicantly
in general. But there was a signicant increase in the case of Type3 farmers. This is not specic
for sugarcane farming. Figures 10(a) and 10(b) show how the Type1 farmers’ savings and Type3
farmers’ savings changed over the course of time when the storage capacities increased.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 10. (a) Graph of the savings of Type1 farmers vs Number of time cycles(number of 4 month cycles) (b)
Graph of the savings of Type3 farmers vs Number of time cycles(number of 4 month cycles
Below are some simulations that reduced the number of farmers moving out of sugarcane
farming:
(1) By increasing the requirement of ethanol we can see some substantial improvement in the
income of the farmers. Figure 11(a) and 11(b) show the number of people moving out of
sugarcane farming versus the ethanol requirement for blending. At present blending is only
3.5%. The simulation shows that if blending of 10% is made mandatory, then approximately
50% of the sugarcane farmers will remain in farming. By changing the blend percentage
to 20%, 70% of sugarcane farmers will remain in farming. We also tried to see whether
changing the price of ethanol helps sugarcane farmers. Figure 11(c) shows the results.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 11. (a) Graph of the number of farmers moving out vs requirement of ethanol in kilo-litres, (b) Graph of
the number of farmers moving out vs requirement of ethanol in kilo-litres with x-axis scale 10 times as (a), (c)
Graph of the number of farmers moving out vs price of ethanol in Rs/L
(2) Increasing ethanol requirement or increase in ethanol price also leads to stabilization
of price of sugar. Due to ethanol business being sustainable sugar production can be
controlled, as opposed to converting all the sugarcane to sugar due to the wastage of
sugarcane involved. Figure 12(a) captures this eect. In all the graphs, ‘Price of Type 0’
refers to sugar price.
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
1:10 Satyandra Guthula, Sunil Easaw Simon, and Harish C Karnick
(a) (b)
Fig. 12. (a) Graph of price of sugar in Rs/intal vs Time cycles when ethanol price is kept as 22 Rs/L. Though
the fluctuation may seem huge but the fluctuation is actually small (4 Rs/kg) (b) Graph of price of sugar in
Rs/intal vs Time cycles when ethanol price is kept as 58 Rs/L.
(3) From gure 12(b), it can be seen that the price does not change a lot. The initial price
uctuation is due to excess sugar produced due to lack of initial demand information
for sugar. Because sugar can be stored easily, the amount of sugar in the market can be
monitored and the price of sugar kept in check. The increase in ethanol requirement
promotes the production of ethanol and hence does not let the store houses be lled with
unmanageable amount of sugar.
(a) (b)
Fig. 13. (a) Graph of price of sugar in Rs/intal vs Time cycles when ethanol requirement at is kept at
40,00,00,000 Litres. (b) Graph of price of sugar in Rs/intal vs Time cycles when ethanol requirement is kept
at 2,20,00,00,000L. From the graph, it can be seen that the price doesn’t change a lot here as well
(4) From the gures 13(a) and 13(b) we can see that the increase in ethanol requirement can
also provide a stabilizing eect on the price of sugarcane. Even at low prices of ethanol, if
the demand for ethanol is signicant the total prot made by the mill owners is substantial
and makes the ethanol business viable. So, similar to the case where the ethanol prices
were changed, the sugar production can be manipulated to make the overall sugar and
ethanol business protable.
(5) We have also tried to see what happens when farmers are given an alternative crop to
sugarcane. With the introduction of one alternative whose price is one third the price of
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sugar and export price slightly higher than the average price of the new crop (10% more) the
situation improves greatly. The main advantage here is that the ratio of people moving out
of agriculture becomes approximately 5% which is much better than the best case scenario
of ethanol price increase or ethanol requirement increase (which is approximately 20%).
(6) The addition of the new crop also has a stabilizing eect on the prices of both crops.
With the introduction of a second crop and alternating the crops the farmer can get better income
because by the time the second crop gives a yield the price of sugar goes up and vice-versa.
So, the following are some policy suggestions:
• Increase the ethanol requirement by increasing blending percentage of ethanol with petrol.
• Increase the ethanol price to a value above 55 or 60 Rs/L. This will be a small price to pay if
we can treat petrol just as another commodity and apply GST.
• Come up with alternative crops for sugarcane farmers that have a produce price at least 5
times the FRP, export price at least 10% more than the average price oered for the new
crop and the yield of at least 5 tonne per acre, which is 10% of the sugarcane yield per acre.
For example onions or potatoes.
We have also simulated the policies implemented by Central Government of India regarding
sugarcane.
We have simulated 10% ethanol blended with petrol policy by varying the FRP from Rs 270 per
Quintal to Rs 500 per Quintal. The ethanol prices used were Rs 51 per litre and Rs 60 per litre,
because these were the prices proposed by the Central Government depending on how the ethanol
was made in the mills.
(a) (b)
Fig. 14. (a) Graph of Farmers leaving sugarcane agriculture vs FRP when ethanol price is Rs 51/litre. (b) Graph
of Farmers leaving sugarcane agriculture vs FRP when ethanol price is Rs 60/litre.
From gures 14(a) and 14(b), we see that unless the FRP increases the value paid by the mills
to the farmers it does not sustain the farmers. From gure 15(a) we can see even after changing
ethanol prices, if the FRP remains the same, it is still not protable for type1 farmers. But for type3
farmers who have large land holdings, sugarcane farming remains protable, which can be seen
from gure 15(b).
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(a) (b)
Fig. 15. (a) Graph of Farmers leaving the sugarcane agriculture vs ethanol price when FRP is Rs 275/intal.
(b) Graph of type 3 farmer’s savings vs time cycles when FRP is Rs 275/intal and ethanol price is Rs 51/litre.
5 CONCLUSION
Multi agent systems can be used as a reliable tool to simulate the outcomes of dierent policies.
While the current model is fairly simple it is much easier to build more detailed models with
more complex decision processes for agents and richer interactions among agents. More work
needs to be done on using Multi-Agent Systems coupled with intelligent learning agents in the
socio-economic sector. The behaviour of the agents can be changed and the number of agents
can be scaled depending on requirements and resources. Availability of good data and the ability
to identify and model all the agents and factors in the real system is the main limitation for this
kind of modelling. Assuming the model is valid the simulations show that current policies are not
sucient for improving the livelihood of farmers. The suggested alternatives should be considered
and empirically tested.
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